Models, Inference, and Decisions
What We Do
Recent research in cognitive and behavioral sciences is increasingly illuminating the basic mechanisms of human reasoning and cognition, as well as their limitations and systematic deviations from normative theories of rational inference and decision-making. It also raises interesting questions concerning the foundations and methods of different scientific disciplines, and the analysis of scientific reasoning in general.
This research line puts together theoretical and formal models of inference and decision-making with empirical approaches to the study of human reasoning and cognition. The aim is twofold: to better understand, and possibly improve, how people reason and make choices in different contexts, both in ordinary life and in science; and to clarify and strengthen the methodology and foundations of cognitive, behavioral, and social sciences.
Topics we work, or plan to work, on include:
Formal epistemology and philosophy of science: Bayesian confirmation theory, truthlikeness theory, cognitive decision theory.
Philosophy of cognitive, behavioral, and social sciences, including neuroscience, (behavioral) economics, medicine, forensic science, statistics, machine learning, history, textual criticism, etc.
Philosophical issues in the foundations, epistemology, and the methodology of science: e.g., reverse inference, abduction, analogy, simplicity, replicability, explainability, etc.
Normative and descriptive models of reasoning, rational inference and decision-making: heuristics and biases, ecological rationality, nudge theory.
Analysis of expert judgment and reasoning, especially clinical and legal reasoning.
Inferences and fallacies in moral and social dilemmas.
Neural bases of different kinds of reasoning (deductive, inductive, abductive, etc.).
Rationality as truth approximation
PRIN project From models to decisions (2019-2021)
Reasoning, uncertainty, and expert judgment
NUTS (Nudge Unit Toscana per la Salute), joint IMT - ARS Toscana initiative
Rationality, social interaction, and the human sciences
Who We Are
What We Publish
A partial consequence account of truthlikenessFesta, R.; Cevolani, G.Synthese, 2020. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-01947-3
A Millian Look at the Logic of Clinical TrialsFesta, R.; Cevolani, G.; Tambolo, L.Uncertainty in Pharmacology, 2020. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-29179-2_9
Fallibilism, verisimilitude, and the Preface ParadoxCevolani, G.Erkenntnis, 2017. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9811-0
G. Cevolani, D. Coraci - Reverse Inference, Bayesian Confirmation, and the Neuroscience of Moral Reasoning’ . 2020 International Neuroethics Society Conference, online, October 22-23 2020.
G. Cevolani, C. Lucifora - Ethical and Cognitive Challenges in the COVID-19 Emergency. 2020 International Neuroethics Society Conference, online, October 22-23 2020.
G. Cevolani, E. Peruzzi - Rationality, idealized models, and truth approximation. SIE 2020 Conference, online, October 21, 2020.
D. Coraci - Theories of ad hoc categories: bridging the gap, ECAP10 Virtual Conference, Uthrecht, August 17, 2020.
D. Coraci - An integrated theory on the construction of ad hoc concepts, AISC Conference 2019, University Roma Tre, Rome, December 13, 2020.