Models, Inference, and Decisions
What We Do
Recent research in cognitive and behavioral sciences is increasingly illuminating the basic mechanisms of human reasoning and cognition, as well as their limitations and systematic deviations from philosophical and normative theories of rational inference and decision-making. We put together theoretical and formal models with empirical approaches to study human reasoning and cognition. The aim is to better understand, and possibly improve, how people reason and make choices in different contexts, both in ordinary life and in science. We work on:
Normative and descriptive models of reasoning, rational inference and decision-making: heuristics and biases, ecological rationality, nudge theory; expert judgment and reasoning (e.g., clinical reasoning, legal reasoning, etc.); reasoning under uncertainty and fallacies; reasoning in moral and social dilemmas.
Methodological aspects of social, cognitive and behavioral sciences: models of inferences and fallacies in scientific reasoning; confirmation theory and Bayesian reasoning; game-theoretical foundations of economics and social sciences.
Neural correlates of reasoning, choice and strategic behavior: plasticity of strategic sophistication in interactive decision making; neural correlates of sophisticated and unsophisticated decision-making; relationships between intelligence and the ways social and individual information is utilized to make decisions; choice in two and multi-persons games.
Rationality as truth approximation
PRIN project From models to decisions (2019-2021)
Reasoning, uncertainty, and expert judgment
NUTS (Nudge Unit Toscana per la Salute), joint IMT - ARS Toscana initiative
Rationality, social interaction, and the human sciences
Who We Are
What We Publish
A partial consequence account of truthlikenessFesta, R.; Cevolani, G.Synthese, 2020. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-01947-3
A Millian Look at the Logic of Clinical TrialsFesta, R.; Cevolani, G.; Tambolo, L.Uncertainty in Pharmacology, 2020. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-29179-2_9
Fallibilism, verisimilitude, and the Preface ParadoxCevolani, G.Erkenntnis, 2017. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9811-0
G. Cevolani, D. Coraci - Reverse Inference, Bayesian Confirmation, and the Neuroscience of Moral Reasoning’ . 2020 International Neuroethics Society Conference, online, October 22-23 2020.
G. Cevolani, C. Lucifora - Ethical and Cognitive Challenges in the COVID-19 Emergency. 2020 International Neuroethics Society Conference, online, October 22-23 2020.
G. Cevolani, E. Peruzzi - Rationality, idealized models, and truth approximation. SIE 2020 Conference, online, October 21, 2020.
D. Coraci - Theories of ad hoc categories: bridging the gap, ECAP10 Virtual Conference, Uthrecht, August 17, 2020.
D. Coraci - An integrated theory on the construction of ad hoc concepts, AISC Conference 2019, University Roma Tre, Rome, December 13, 2020.